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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

STEPHEN K. VANCE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20001151-CA
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Whether the district court erred in failing to give jury instructions requested by Mr.
Vance?

Standard of Review: Whether a trial court committed error in refusing to give a
requested jury instruction is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness.
State v. Kruger. 6 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Utah 2000), citing State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,
238 (Utah 1992).

B.

Whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Vance's due
process rights in failing to evaluate the Ramirez factors before permitting in-court
identifications by the eyewitnesses?

Standard of Review: "In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit, we defer to
the trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
trial court's decision to admit and by reversing its factual findings only if they are against
the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991)
(citations omitted). "[Wjhether these facts [found by the district court ] are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Id
(citations omitted).
C.

Whether the trial erred and abused its discretion in permitting in-court
identifications that were unreliable?
Standard of Review: Same as B.

D.

Whether the trial court erred in denying the defense's motion for a directed verdict
and to dismiss with regard to the charges alleging M.P. as a victim?

Standard of Review: A jury verdict will only be reversed when, "after viewing
the evidence all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [the
court] find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v.
Lopez. 2001 UT App. 123, If 10 (Utah Ct. App. April 12, 2001). Furthermore, to support
a claim for insufficient evidence on appeal, the defendant must marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings and demonstrate how the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the disputed findings.
See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, amend XIV
Utah Constitution, article I, § 7

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Stephen Vance was charged with three counts of lewdness with a child stemming
from an incident on May 15, 1999, wherein Mr. Vance is alleged to have exposed himself
to three girls under the age of fourteen. (R. 2-4.) At arraignment, the Honorable Judge
Joseph Fratto appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) to represent
Mr. Vance. (R. 14.) At the pretrial conference, the matter was set for jury trial on
November 30, 1999. (R. 22.) On November 22, 1999, defense counsel requested a bail
reduction and the jury trial was continued. (R. 22-24.) On January 25, 2000, Mr. Vance
and defense counsel appeared for trial and requested a continuance, which the court
denied. The case proceeded to jury trial wherein Mr. Vance was convicted of three
counts of lewdness with a child, as charged.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 29, 1999, an information was filed in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, charging Stephen K. Vance
with three counts of lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (1953, as amended). (R. 2-4.) The charges arosefroman
incident on May 15, 1999, wherein Mr. Vance was alleged to have exposed his genitals to
three girls under the age of 14. (R. 4.)
On October 18, 1999, Mr. Vance appeared before the Honorable Joseph Fratto for
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arraignment on these charges. Mr. Vance pled not guilty and the matter was set for
pretrial conference on November 1, 1999. The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
was appointed to represent Mr. Vance. When Mr. Vance appeared for the pretrial
conference on November 1, 1999, the matter was set for jury trial on November 30, 1999.
On November 22, 1999, the court agreed to reduce Mr. Vance's bond from
$10,000 to $5,000 and ordered that Mr. Vance be supervised through Pretrial Services.
The jury trial date was then reset to December 14, 1999. On December 14, 1999, a case
higher in priority than Mr. Vance's went forward to trial and as a result, Mr. Vance's case
was rescheduled for jury trial on January 25, 2000. On January 11, 2000, based on
representations by the deputy district attorney, Byron "Fred" Burmester, that he may be
seeking an in-person lineup, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress any in-court
identifications and to preclude Mr. Vance from having to appear at an in-person lineup.
On January 25, 2000, numerous trials were set to be heard, including
approximately nine cases which were higher in priority than Mr. Vance's based on the
alleged violation date. Throughout the week prior to trial, defense counsel contacted both
the court and Mr. Burmester in an attempt to ascertain whether or not Mr. Vance's case
would be heard on January 25th. Mr. Burmester informed both the court and defense
counsel that a case involving private counsel would be proceeding on January 25th and
would result in Mr. Vance's case being continued. Defense counsel confirmed this
information on Friday, January 21st with Mr. Burmester and with the court, and left a
4

message for Mr. Vance informing him that his trial would not proceed as scheduled on
January 25th. At approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 24th, defense counsel contacted the
court regarding a different matter and was informed that the court had received word from
Mr. Burmester that the case involving private counsel had settled and that Mr. Vance's
case would instead be proceeding. Defense counsel immediately contacted Mr. Vance
and informed him of the change but assured him that every attempt would be made to
obtain a continuance of the case.
On the morning of January 25, defense counsel explained the past days' events to
the court and requested a continuance, which the court denied. (R. 144:19-20.) Defense
counsel also argued the motion to suppress any in-court identifications of Mr. Vance,
which the court also denied. (R. 144:7-14.) The jury pool was then brought into the
courtroom and a six-person jury was selected to hear the case. (R. 144:53.)
According to testimony adduced at trial, on May 15, 1999, M.S. and H.S., and
their friend M.P.,1 accompanied Corina Swenson, M.S.'s and H.S.'s mother, to a park
located at 7300 South 700 East, in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 144: 108.). While Corina
Swenson watched her son play a baseball game, M.S., M.P. and H.S. awaited in Corina's
van playing board games. (R. 144: 78, 97.) According to H.S., who is ten years old, a
man pulled his car up next to the van. (R. 144: 78.) She looked over at the man and

1

Notably, M.P. neither testified nor appeared for trial, despite a subpoena issued
for her appearance at the trial on January 25, 2000.
5

noticed that he was wearing short shorts and that his penis was exposed. (R. 144: 78-80.)
According to H.S., the man was looking at the girls through the rearview mirror in his car.
(R. 144: 79, 88.) According to M.S., who is seven years old, H.S. observed the man and
then told the other girls to "look." (R. 144: 100.) The man did not masturbate or
otherwise touch his genital area. (R: 144: 99-100.)
Thereafter, M.S. and H.S. exited the van and informed their mother, Corina, that
the man in the car parked next to their van had exposed his penis to them. (R. 144: 80,
100.) Corina looked toward the van and saw the vehicle the girls were referring to. (R.
144: 117.) Corina informed the other parents, including Denise and Harry Segura, what
the girls had told her and asked them to call the police. (R. 144: 117-118.)
As Corina walked toward the car with another parent, Bruce Benzon, the vehicle
slowly pulled out of the parking lot. (R. 144: 117-18, 125.) Corina and Bruce followed
the car on foot and were able to write down the vehicle's license plate number. (R. 144:
117-18; 125-26.) When the police arrived, they obtained statements from the parents and
the girls and were given the license plate number. (R. 144: 127, 135.)
A week later, on May 23, 1999, Denise Segura, one of the parents who was present
when the May 15th incident allegedly occurred, was present at the same park. (R. 144:
188.) Ms. Segura saw the vehicle allegedly involved in the prior incident enter the park.
(R. 144: 189-90.) Based solely on identification of the vehicle, not the driver, Ms. Segura
told her husband, Harry, to call the police. (R. 144: 190.) In the interim, the driver of the
6

vehicle got out and sat on a park bench reading a book. (R. 144: 190-92.)
Officer Proulx and Officer Egan responded to the park and with the assistance of
the Seguras, located Stephen Vance sitting on the northeast side of the park. (R. 144:
143.) The Seguras informed the officers that Mr. Vance had driven a grey Monte Carlo
to the park. (R. 144: 143.)
The officers approached Mr. Vance and began to interrogate him with regard to
how he had arrived at the park and whether he owned a grey Monte Carlo. (R. 144: 14445.) Mr. Vance indicated that he had walked to the park and owned a truck which was
still parked at the extended stay hotel where he was living. (R. 144: 169.) In his
testimony, Mr. Vance explained that he had told the officer he did not drive to the park
because he knew that his driver's license was suspended and his car registration had
expired. (R. 144: 218.) Officer Egan ran a licence plate check and discovered that the
grey Monte Carlo was registered to Mr. Vance. (R. 144: 143-45.) On this basis, Mr.
Vance was arrested. (R. 144: 143-35.)
Subsequently, Officer Nudd gathered together a photo lineup wherein Mr. Vance's
driver's license photograph appeared in the #2 position of a six person lineup. (R. 144:
158, 162.) Officer Nudd showed this lineup to M.S. and H.S. (R. 144: 159), Ms. Swenson
(R. 144: 159), and Denise and Harry Segura. (R. 144: 159.) Another office showed the
photo lineup to Bruce Benzon. (R. 144: 159-60.) Ms. Swenson could not identify the
alleged perpetrator, but did narrow her suspicions down to two individuals shown in the
7

six-person photo lineup. (R. 144: 129.) M.S. picked out an individual in the #6 position
of the photo lineup as the perpetrator (R. 144: 106), while H.S. did not identify anyone
from the photo lineup as the perpetrator. (R. 144: 90.) Denise and Harry Segura
similarly failed to identify Mr. Vance from the photo lineup as the perpetrator. (R. 144:
194, 197-98, 207.) Ms. Segura did testify, however, that she informed the officer that the
person in the #2 position "looked the most like" the perpetrator, but she could not
conclusively say that the person depicted in the #2 position was the perpetrator. (R. 144:
197-98.) When asked how she arrived at this determination, Ms. Segura admitted that she
and her husband did so together through a process of elimination, expecting that the
suspected perpetrator's photograph would appear somewhere in the photo lineup.2 (R.
144: 197-98.) Ms. Segura further admitted that his identification of Mr. Vance in court
was based primarily on seeing him in the park on May 22, not on May 15th, the date of the
actual incident. (R. 144: 196-97.) Mr. Segura admitted the same, indicating that he
recognized the car in the park on May 22 as the same car from May 15th, but that he did
not recognize the driver as the same person. (R. 144: 203, 207.) Thus, none of the
individuals who were presented with the photo lineup were able to identify Mr. Vance.
Based on the inability of the witnesses to identify Mr. Vance through the photo
lineup and the inherent unreliability of subsequent identifications, defense counsel moved
2

With respect to this issue, Ms. Segura testified: "Yeah. Based on my husband and I
looking at the pictures, just kind of went like ruling out, you know, he wasn't bald and he wasn't
young and then it came down to where we said, we think it's 2." (R. 144: 198.)
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to suppress any in-court identifications. (R. 36-45.) Defense counsel argued that because
none of the individuals pictured in the photo lineup would be present at trial other than
Mr. Vance, any in-court identifications would be the product of recognition of Mr. Vance
from the photo lineup and the juxtaposition of Mr. Vance and defense counsel seated in
the courtroom on the day of trial, not because the alleged victims recognized Mr. Vance
as the perpetrator.
On the morning of trial, the court heard defense counsel's motion to continue and
motion to suppress in-court identification. The court denied both motions and the matter
proceeded to jury trial.
Defense counsel invoked the exclusionary rule and all witnesses were sworn and
then excluded from the proceedings. The jury heard testimony from H.S., M.S., Corina
Swenson, Bruce Benzon, Officer Chad Egan, Officer Craig Proulx, Officer Keith Volpe
and Detective Kimberly Nudd. At the conclusion of the testimony of these witnesses, the
state rested. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, citing inter alia, insufficient
evidence and identification issues. The court denied the motion and Mr. Vance then
testified. Mr. Vance explained that it was not unusual for him to loan his vehicle out to
friends who lived at an apartment complex where he provided maintenance services. Mr.
Vance further testified that it was quite possible he had loaned his vehicle out on the 15th
of May, as that was a normal working day for him and a day during which someone at the
complex may have asked to use his vehicle.
9

The defense rested and renewed its motions for directed verdict and to dismiss.
Defense counsel also objected to several jury instructions. The court denied defense
counsel's motions and noted defense counsel's objections to the instructions. The jury
then heard closing argument and retired to deliberate. During the course of deliberations,
the jury submitted the following questions to the court:
1. Is there information in the police report of clothing or inventory of
clothing [of defendant] upon arrest?
2. Where are the Peay's, particularly McKenzie P. [sic] Did they file a report, [sic]
Is there a reason that this was not addressed?
3. Why was there no people [sic] from the defendants [sic] apt. to prove he loans
his car out?
Louis Darger [juror]
(R. 107) (attached hereto as Addendum D).
The court informed counsel of these inquiries and requested input from both the
prosecutor and defense counsel. Defense counsel urged the court to inform the jury of the
burden of proof and to clarify that Mr. Vance had no burden of proving his innocence and
that the state bore the entire burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 144:
276-77.) Defense counsel noted that the third query by the jurors amounted to
inappropriate burden-shifting and it was clear from the question that the jury did not
understand the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. (R. 144:276-77.) The
court declined to provide any additional information to the jury but responded to their

10

queries by informing them to reread the jury instructions. (R. 108.)
Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Vance on all three counts
of lewdness with a child, class A misdemeanors. (R. 110-112.) Sentencing was
scheduled for March 6, 2000, and Mr. Vance was referred to Adult Probation and Parole
for a presentence report. (R. 116.) On March 6, 2000, Mr. Vance failed to appear for
sentencing and the court issued a $25,000 bench warrant. (R. 119-20.) Subsequently,
Mr. Vance turned himself on December 6, 2000, and the court scheduled sentencing for
December 14, 2000. (R. 119.)
The court ordered that Mr. Vance serve one year in jail for each offense, to run
consecutively, and that he pay a $1,500 fine for each offense. (R. 131.) The court further
ordered that the sentence and fines be suspended and Mr. Vance be placed on probation
under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole for three years, subject to the
following conditions: (1) that Mr. Vance serve one year in jail, with credit for 43 days
Mr. Vance previously served on this case; (2) no violations of the law; (3) compliance
with Adult Probation and Parole conditions of probation; (4) completion of the ISP
program; (5) that Mr. Vance complete all appropriate evaluations; and (6) that Mr. Vance
pay all costs of supervision, counseling and treatment. (R. 131.) Defense counsel then
motioned the court to stay imposition of Mr. Vance's sentence pending appeal. (R. 145:
19.) The court denied defense counsel's motion and Mr. Vance was ordered to begin
serving his sentence forthwith. (R. 145:19.)
11

On February 20, 2001, defense counsel filed a written motion with the district
court for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. (R. at blue supp. 3/12/2001, 112.)3 The court initially issued a written denial of the motion for a certificate of probable
cause but then subsequently scheduled the matter for a hearing. (R. at blue supp.
3/12/2001, 7.) On March 16, 2001, the court heard argument from both defense counsel
and the state prosecutor and denied defense counsel's motion for the issuance of a
certificate of probable cause. (R. at blue supp. 4/17/2001.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Vance was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to properly
instruct the jury on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence when it became
clear the jury did not understand these legal principles. Moreover, Mr. Vance was denied
due process when the trial court refused to suppress any in-court identifications without
conducting a thorough analysis of the eyewitness identifications pursuant to Ramirez.
This is particularly true given that the identifications were unreliable. Finally, Mr. Vance
was denied due process when he was convicted of lewdness with regard to M.P. where
M.P. failed to appear for trial and the state presented insufficient evidence to warrant Mr.
Vance's conviction with regard to M.P.

3

This motion is contained in a supplement to the record which was not numbered.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO GIVE DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION
The trial court committed error in failing to instruct the jury that an accused bears

no burden of proving his or her innocence in a criminal trial and that the burden of
proving an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is borne solely by the State.
During the course of deliberations, the jury returned with three questions, one of
which essentially asked why Mr. Vance had failed to call witnesses to prove his
innocence. Specifically, the jurors asked: "Why was [sic] there no people from the
defendants [sic] apt. to prove he loans his car out?11 The essence of Mr. Vance's defense
was that he frequently lent his vehicle out to tenants at the Pinehurst apartment complex
where he was employed as a maintenance person. Mr. Vance testified it was likely he
had lent his vehicle to a tenant on the date of the offense and that therefore, while his
vehicle was present at the scene of the offense on May 15, 1999, he was not.
The question of whether a trial court commits error in refusing to give a requested
jury instruction is a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v.
Krager, 6 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Utah 2000), citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238
(Utah 1992). Pursuant to Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court.
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in
13

the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given.
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to
the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the
record.
Here, the jury received written instructions explaining the state's burden of proof and the
defendant's presumption of innocence. (R. 88-89) (attached hereto as Addendum E).
Despite these instructions, the jury misunderstood the instructions or improperly applied
them to the specifics of this case, as is evidenced by the burden-shifting questions
returned by the jury mid-deliberations. (R. 107.)
In a criminal case, due process requires that the prosecution prove every element
of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const.
amend. V, XIV; State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 195 (Utah 1999) ("as both a state and
federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that the prosecution
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v.
Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process mandates that the prosecution
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v.
Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State has burden of proving all
elements of a crime); State v. Starks. 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) ("A fundamental
precept of our criminal law is that the state must prove all elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt."); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1999) ("A defendant in a
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criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.11).
Because the theory advanced by Mr. Vance at trial did not constitute an affirmative
defense, Mr. Vance had no burden of presenting evidence or otherwise proving his theory
of the case. Compare Swenson, 838 P.2d at 1138 (Imposing "on the prosecution the
burden to disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, once
the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense."). When the jury submitted a
question to the judge which asked for an explanation of why Mr. Vance did not prove his
theory of the case, defense counsel asked the court to either refer the jury back to specific
instructions regarding the burden of proof and ask the jury to re-read the particular
instruction or to verbally explain the presumption of innocence and burden of proof to the
jury. (R. 144: 276.) Defense counsel argued that the jurors' question suggested that the
jury was engaging in burden-shifting, requiring Mr. Vance to prove his innocence. (R.
144: 277.) Clearly, the jurors' question reflected that the jury failed to comprehend both
the burden of proof and to understand that it is the state which is charged with meeting
that burden. The court declined both of defense counsel's suggestions and instead
informed the jury to re-read all instructions previously provided by the court. (R. 108.)
Utah courts have previously determined that "it 'is not error to refuse a proposed
instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions.'" State v. Hamilton.
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827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992), quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982).
See also State v. Spencer. 28 Utah 2d 12, 497 P.2d 636 (1972); State v. Miller. 24 Utah
2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970); State v. Martinez. 21 Utah 2d 187, 442 P.2d 943 (1968).
However, this proposition has been adopted in cases where a trial court refused to give a
requested instruction prior to the jury retiring for deliberations, not in cases involving a
request for an instruction during deliberations. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 232 (trial court did
not commit prejudicial error in declining to give proffered cautionary jury instruction
regarding fingerprint evidence where fingerprint evidence is not subject to the same
problems and special treatment as eyewitness testimony); Sessions, 645 P.2d at 643 (trial
court did not commit prejudicial error in declining proffered diminished capacity
instruction where jury was instructed on elements of offense, state's burden of proof, the
effect of intoxication on intent to commit an offense, and the elements of the lesser
included offense); Spencer, 497 P.2d at 636 (trial court did not commit prejudicial error in
failing to instruct jury of right to disagree and refuse to surrender honest convictions
regarding weight or effect of evidence for purpose of reaching agreement where such
information covered by other instructions); Miller, 464 P.2d at 844 (no prejudicial error in
trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction on intent to defraud where
other instructions clearly incorporated defendant's requested instruction without
defendant's emphasis); Martinez, 442 P.2d at 308 (no prejudicial error in trial court's
refusal to give proffered instruction on alternative facts, conclusions and theories where
16

information cumulative and covered in other instructions).
In cases where jurors submitted questions after initiating deliberations, the
appellate courts seem more inclined to require a trial court to offer specific answers which
correctly state the law. For example, in State v. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 406 P.2d 308
(Utah 1965), the jury had retired to deliberate before returning to ask the judge some
questions in a case involving the passing of a check without sufficient funds to cover the
check amount. In response to the jurors' questions,4 the judge instructed the jury that the
defendant must have money in the bank or an arrangement with the bank to pay it when
he writes the check. On appeal, the Court found this instruction to be improper because it
provided an erroneous statement of the law; if the evidence indicated the defendant had
arranged to have money or credit in the bank at the time the check was presented for
payment, any intent to defraud would be negated. The Court reversed the defendant's
conviction rejecting the state's argument that the element of intent to defraud at the time
of issuance was properly covered in the written instructions to the jury, and under the rule
that all instructions should be considered together, no prejudicial error resulted. The
Court noted:
We recognize the validity of that rule generally. But like most rules, it is
not so absolute that it can be invariably and arbitrarily given effect in all
circumstances. It must be applied sensibly and reasonably in relation to the
particular fact situation at hand.
4

There is nothing in the Coleman opinion reciting the questions the jurors asked of
the judge.
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Id at 310.
In State v. Couch. 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1981), the jury was asked to determine
whether, inter alia, the defendant had committed the offense of forcible sodomy. After
the jurors had retired to deliberate, they asked the judge to further instruct them with
regard to the definition of "genitals" as used in the forcible sodomy statute. Id. at 94.
The judge refused to provide the jury with a definition of "genitals." On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure to provide the jury with a definition of
word "genitals" constituted reversible error where application of the proper definition of
the word was essential to the proper application of the forcible sodomy law. Id. at 94-95.
In so holding, the Court pointed out that "where a jury at its own instance requests the •
definition of a term whose understanding is essential to a proper application of the law,
the trial judge must provide the requested definition." Id, at 95. See also People v. Alexis,
794 P.2d 1029, 1031 ("When the jury indicates to the court that it does not understand
some matter of law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court has an
obligation to clarify that matter for the jury in a concrete and unambiguous manner."),
reversed on other grounds, 806 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1991). In this analysis, "[t]he critical fact
is that the jury has signified its lack of understanding of the meaning of a word it must
apply in performing its function." Couch, 635 P.2d at 95.
Similarly, here the jury asked a question which reflected its misunderstanding of
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the standards it had to apply in order to properly perform its function: the presumption of
innocence and the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under
these circumstances, where the jury instructions set out the proper burden of proof and the
presumption of innocence, yet the jury still failed to grasp those concepts or apply them to
the specifics of the case, the trial court had an absolute duty to clearly and unambiguously
instruct the jury that Mr. Vance had no burden to prove his innocence and/or refer the
jury to the specific instructions which set forth the presumption of innocence and burden
of proof. Because this error so fundamentally abrogated Mr. Vance's constitutional
rights, the only appropriate remedy is a new trial. See, e.g. Couch, 635 P.2d at 95-96
(failure to provide jury with requested definition was reversible error requiring remand
for a new trial).
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EVALUATE THE
RAMIREZ FACTORS BEFORE PERMITTING IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATIONS BY THE WITNESSES
The trial court's failure to adequately evaluate the reliability of the eyewitness

identifications before denying defense counsel's motion to suppress in-court
identifications constitutes reversible error. In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit
evidence of eyewitness identification, this Court ndefer[s] to the trial court's fact-finding
role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision to admit
and by reversing its factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the
evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted).
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'[W]hether these facts are sufficient to demonstrate reliability is a question of law" which

this Court reviews for correctness. Id. (Citations omitted). It is important to remember,
however, that the prosecution always bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility
of an eyewitness identification by laying "a foundation upon which the trial court can
make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any necessary legal
conclusions." Id at 778. (citations omitted).
As the Ramirez Court noted,
Potential for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional guarantees
inheres in this overlap of responsibility of judge and jury to determine the
same issue. Because the jury is not bound by the judge's preliminary
factual determination made in ruling on admissibility, the trial court may be
tempted to abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered
evidence constitutional defects and may simply admit the evidence, leaving
all questions pertinent to its reliability to the jury. But courts cannot
properly sidestep their responsibility to perform the required constitutional
admissibility analysis. To do so would leave protection of constitutional
rights to the whim of a jury and would abandon the courts' responsibility to
apply the law. The danger of such an abdication of responsibility is
particularly serious where the admissibility of an eyewitness identification
is concerned because of the probability that such evidence even though
thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on a jury.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778 - 79 (citations omitted).
In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 774, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a totality of the
circumstances approach for determining the due process reliability of eyewitness
identifications in accordance with Article I, section 7 of the Utah State Constitution.5
5

Because Utah has adopted rigorous due process analysis with respect to the
constitutional reliability of eyewitness testimony that is arguably more rigorous than the
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This approach requires consideration of, at minimum, the five factors set forth in
Ramirez. kL at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)). If an eyewitness
identification is unreliable pursuant to these factors, admission of the identification will
deny a defendant due process. Id. at 779. Here, the trial court failed to address the
factors set forth in Ramirez, inappropriately relegating that decision-making authority to
the jury. The jury has no authority to decide questions of law.
Prior to trial, defense counsel informed the court of her concerns that none of the
witnesses presented with a six-person photo line-up could identify Mr. Vance as the
perpetrator of the May 15, 1999, offense. (R. 144: 7-8.) Defense counsel objected to the
eyewitnesses making an in-court identification due to their prior inability to identify Mr.
Vance and the fact that he would be the only person from the photo line-up who would be
present during trial. (R. 144: 8.) Defense counsel argued that any in-court identification
would be inherently unreliable. (R. 144: 9.)
The prosecutor argued that identification testimony is inadmissible only when
witnesses lack the ability to see a perpetrator in the first instance. The prosecutor asserted
that all witnesses observed the perpetrator for at least five minutes, in the daylight, at a

federal analysis, the failure to meet the due process requirements of the Utah Constitution
automatically renders the admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784.
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distance of forty feet or less.6 (R. 144: 9-10.) For these reasons, the prosecutor objected
to Mr. Vance's motion and asked that both the photo line-up and the in-court
identifications be allowed. (R. 144: 11)
Defense counsel responded by noting that the defense was not objecting to the
admission of the photo line-up, but only to any in-court identifications. (R. 144: 11-12.)
The court responded as follows:
Well, and I think- - well, and I guess what I'm struck with here is
that - - that these are matters for the jury to consider in terms of how good
an identification is in Court. If the witness is asked to identify somebody, if
they're able to do that, they're able to do that. And then as a matter of
impeachment, if you will, that something has happened in the past that may
taint that identification.
Now, if it's as a result of an improper photo spread or line-up, I'm - then that shouldn't - - that certainly should be raised by way of a mo- - pretrial motion to consider that. And indeed, the conclusion could be to
prohibit that witness from making that in-court identification because it has
been tainted by something that's happened in the past.
(R. 144: 12-13.) Following further argument from defense counsel, the court concluded:
And I understand what you're saying, but I - - that's - - those factors,
I mean, I'm not able to conclude as a matter of law that because someone is
sitting next to you, they're more likely to be identified. Those are indeed
arguments, I suppose, to be made to the jury as impeachment of the
witness' identification, not as a matter of law that, unless we had the - - all
the people involved in the line-up and so forth, sitting next to you and so
forth.
6

None of the witnesses testified to observing the perpetrator for more than a brief period
of time. This factual error would have been corrected had the judge held a hearing wherein the
witnesses would have been required to testify prior to trial and establish the length of time they
actually observed the perpetrator.
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So, your request to - - to quash or to somehow suppress the
identification that a witness may or may not be able to be made is denied.
(R. 144: 14.)
The trial court's abject failure to make factual findings and evaluate those facts
according to the Ramirez factors constitutes an abdication of the trial court's
responsibility as gatekeeper. See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944-945 (Utah App.
1997) (M[W]hen presented with the issue of the constitutional admissibility of eyewitness
identification testimony, a trial court must resolve factual disputes, consider the Ramirez
reliability factors, and legally determine whether the eyewitness identification is
reliable."). In this context, the trial court's gatekeeping responsibility requires resolution
of whether the identification passes constitutional muster. If it does, the matter is
submitted to the jury; if it does not, the identification is excluded as a matter of law. Id. at
943. Such abdication left all questions regarding the reliability of the eyewitness
identifications to the jury. In doing so, the trial court left protection of Mr. Vance's
constitutional rights to the whim of a non-law trained jury of laypersons and abandoned
its responsibility to apply the law. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have
at least made factual findings based on the Ramirez factors or more preferably, held a
hearing on defense counsel's motion prior to trial. Such a hearing would have provided
the trial court with adequate factual information to make a determination of the
admissibility of the eyewitness identifications in this matter prior to the issue ever being
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placed before the trier of fact. The failure to hold such a hearing or make such factual
findings constituted an abdication of the trial court's gatekeeping responsibility and
primary role as arbiter of legal issues. This refusal to perform clear judicial duties
resulted in the denial of Mr. Vance's constitutional rights. Such a violation of essential
constitutional rights demands reversal of Mr. Vance's conviction.
Ill

PURSUANT TO THE RAMIREZ FACTORS, THE IN-COURT
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS WERE NOT RELIABLE AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED
Applying the factors outlined in Ramirez, the in-court eyewitness identifications of

Mr. Vance were wholly unreliable and therefore should have been suppressed by the trial
court at the outset. In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 774, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a
totality of the circumstances approach for determining the due process reliability of
eyewitness identifications in accordance with Article I, section 7 of the Utah State
Constitution. This approach requires consideration of the following factors:
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed,
and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's."
Id at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)). If an eyewitness
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identification is unreliable pursuant to these factors, admission of the identification will
deny a defendant due process. IdL at 779.
A.

OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW THE ACTOR DURING THE EVENT

The first factor to be evaluated is the opportunity of the witnesses to view the
perpetrator during the alleged event. Circumstances include "the length of time the
witness [es] viewed the actor; the distance between the witness and the actor; whether the
witness could view the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were
distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other circumstances
affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the actor." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782.
i

Length of Time the Witnesses Observed the Actor

At trial, H.S. did not indicate how long she was able to observe the man who
exposed himself to her. (R. 144: 78-79.) H.S. testified that the man's car pulled up next
to the van she was sitting in and was there for twenty minutes to an hour before she
noticed that his genitals were exposed. (R. 144: 78-79.) As soon as she noticed the man
was exposing himself, she told the other girls in the van what she had seen. (R. 144: 7980.) The girls stayed in the van for an undetermined period of time and then went and
told Corina Swenson. (R. 144: 80.)
At trial, M.S. was also unable to indicate how long she was able to observe the
man who exposed himself to her. (R. 144: 98-100.) She simply testified that the man
drove his car up next to their van and it was only when H.S. said something that she
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looked over and the saw the man exposed his genitals. (R. 144: 100.) As previously
noted, M.P. was not present at trial and therefore did not testify.
Corina Swenson, mother of H.S. and M.S., testified that she saw the man who was
in the car next to her van near the bathrooms prior to the incident. (R. 144: 113.) She
indicated that she noticed the man near the bathrooms but quickly entered and exited the
bathroom so did not get a long look at him. (R. 144:113-15.) Later, when the girls
approached her about the man exposing himself to them, Corina testified that she could
see the man from about forty feet away backing his car out of the parking lot. (R. 144:
109-10.) Corina testified that she identified the man in the car as the man she had seen by
the restroom from this forty foot distance by his moustache and his sunglasses. (R. 144:
117, 134-35.) Corina further testified that when the man was in the car she saw him from
the side, not the front. (R. 144: 137.) Thereafter, Corina and her friend Bruce followed
the vehicle on foot, viewing the rear of the vehicle as it drove out of the parking lot. (R.
144: 118-19.)
Denise Segura, a parent who was at the park on May 15, 1999, for one of her
children's baseball games also testified that she saw the man in the gray car. (R. 144:18283.) She indicated she saw the man sitting in the passenger seat of his car. (R. 144:183.)
Ms. Segura indicated she made brief eye contact with the man and only saw him from the
shoulders up. (R. 144:183-84.) Ms. Segura testified that she "glanced" at the man and
that was the extent of the time she saw the man. (R. 144:187.)
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ii

Distance Between the Witnesses and the Actor

H.S. did not indicate the distance between herself and the man, aside from
testifying that the man was in a car parked next to her van and that she saw him looking at
her through his rearview mirror. (R. 144:78-79.) H.S. could not remember whether she
actually saw the man's face through the mirror or directly. (R. 144: 89.) M.S. also failed
to indicate the distance between herself and the man, aside from testifying that the man
was parked in a car next to her van and she saw him looking at her through his rearview
mirror. (R. 144: 98-100, 105.)
Corina Swenson testified that she saw the man near the bathrooms prior to the
exposure incident. (R. 144:113.) She indicated that when she noticed the man she was
about ten to fifteen feet away from the man. (R. 144:115.) Later, when the girls
approached her about the man exposing himself to them, Corina testified that she could
see the man from about forty feet away backing his car out of the parking lot. (R.
144:109-10.) Corina testified that she identified the man in the car as the man she had
seen by the restroom from this forty foot distance by his moustache and his sunglasses.
(R. 144:117,134-35.). Corina further testified that when the man was in the car she saw
him from the side, not the front. (R. 144: 137.) Thereafter, Corina and her friend Bruce
followed the vehicle on foot, viewing the rear of the vehicle as it drove out of the parking
lot and having a view only of the back of the man's head. (R. 144: 118-19.)
Denise Segura testified that she pulled her car up next to the gray car in which the
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man was sitting in the passenger seat, making brief "eye contact" with him. (R. 144:18283.)
iii

Whether the Witnesses Could View the Actor's Face

It is questionable whether H.S., M.S., and M.P. could see the man's face. H.S.
testified that she saw the man's face, described that he had on sunglasses, had a
moustache and had curly hair. (R. 144:78.) However, when asked if she had seen the
man's face directly or only through the rearview mirror, H.S. was unable to say. (R. 144:
89.) When asked if she could describe what the man looked like, M.S. stated: "No." (R.
144: 98-99.)
Corina Swenson testified that she was able to see the man's face when he was
standing by the bathroom and that she could see a side-view of his face as he was pulling
out of the parking lot. (R. 144:113, 117, 135-36.) Denise Segura testified that she briefly
glanced at the man's face, but he was wearing sunglasses and had a moustache. (R.
144:183-84,187.)
iv

Lighting or Lack Thereof

There is no dispute that this incident occurred during the daytime and that lighting
was not an issue. However, it is important to note that the girls were inside a car, as was
the perpetrator, so certainly the lighting inside the vehicles was not as good as the lighting
outside of the vehicles.
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v

Presence or Absence of Distracting Noises or Activity During the
Observation

At the time of the observations made by H.S. and M.S., there were multiple
baseball games in progress. (R: 144: 75-76, 97.) Also, the girls were in the middle of
playing board games inside the family minivan. (R. 144: 78, 97.) Corina Swenson
testified that when she saw the man by the bathrooms, there were many people entering
and exiting the building. (R. 144:114.) When Corina saw the man in the car, her son's
game was still in progress and when Denise saw the man, the baseball games were also in
progress. (R. 144:180.) Moreover, Denise was preoccupied with her young son who was
four years old and who was asleep in the backseat of her car. (R. 144:181-82.)
B.

VICTIMS' DEGREE OF ATTENTION TO THE PERPETRATOR

The second reliability factor in Ramirez involves analysis of the victims' degree of
attention to the perpetrator. As previously noted, H.S. and M.S. both testified that the
man in the car had pulled up next to their van anywhere from 20 minutes to one hour
prior to gaining their attention. It was only when H.S. observed the man exposing himself
and told M.S. and M.P. that the girls noticed the man. Even then, the girls testified that
they sat in the van for a little while and then went to tell their mother. While Corina
testified that she noticed the man by the bathroom and identified him as the same person
in the gray car, she did not give tremendous attention to the man by the bathroom, other
than to notice him and make a decision that she was uncomfortable with him. As for
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Denise Segura, she testified that she only saw the man briefly and therefore did not
commit a great degree of attention to the man.
C.

CAPACITY TO OBSERVE ACTOR DURING EVENT

The third reliability factor involves the witnesses' capacity to observe the actor
during the event. Of particular importance is "whether the witness's capacity to observe
was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations,
biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or
alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (citing Long. 721 P.2d at 494 n.8). There is no
indication from the evidence that any of these factors may have affected the ability of the
witnesses to observe the perpetrator.
D.

SPONTANEITY OF IDENTIFICATION AND CONSISTENCY

The fourth reliability factor is whether the identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter or whether it was a product of suggestion. Relevant
circumstances include:
the length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time
of the event and the identification of defendant; the witness's mental
capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification; the witness's
exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information
from other sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a
description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for
identification.
Id.
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i

Length of Time Between Event and Identification

H.S., M.S., Corina Swenson and Denise Segura were shown a photo line-up over
thirty days after the incident. (R. 144: 89-90.) H.S. could not identify Mr. Vance from
the photographs and in fact did not believe any of the six persons depicted in the photo
line-up looked familiar. (R. 144:90.) M.S. also viewed the photo line-up at the same
time and identified a man in the number six position of the photo line-up as the man who
exposed himself to her. (R. 144:102.) Mr. Vance was depicted in the number two
position of the photo line-up. (R. 144:162.) Corina Swenson was shown the photo lineup at the same time her daughters were shown the photographs. (R. 144:128.) Corina
identified the individuals in position number 2 and 6 (R. 144:129.) Bruce Benzon, the
parent who followed the vehicle out of the parking lot with Corina Swenson on the date
of the incident, was shown a photo line-up four months after the incident and could not
identify anyone from the line-up as the driver of the car. (R. 144:153-54.) Denise and
Harry Segura were also shown the same photo line-up a few months after the incident.
(R. 144:193.) Denise Segura testified that she and her husband failed to positively
identify anyone from the line-up but that they kept returning to the person in the number 2
position. (R. 144:197-98.) Denise admitted she could not say for sure the person in the
number 2 position was the person from the park on May 15. (R. 144:197.)
More than six months after the incident, despite the witnesses failure to positively
identify Mr. Vance from the photo line-up, the witnesses were capable of positively
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identifying Mr. Vance at trial when he was the only option to choose from. H.S.
identified Mr. Vance (R. 144:86), as did M.S. (R. 144:103.) However, as defense counsel
tried to point out, when M.S. was asked to look around the room to see if she could see
the man who exposed himself to her, she look only at defense counsel table before saying
that Mr. Vance was the man from the park. (R. 144:103.) Ms. Corina Swenson also
testified at trial she too suddenly recognized Mr. Vance as the man from the park. (R.
144:130.) Finally, Denise Segura identified Mr. Vance in court as well. (R. 144:194.)
Harry Segura, Denise's husband, also identified Mr. Vance in-court. (R. 144:205.)
However, Mr. Segura admitted that his identification of Mr. Vance stemmed from seeing
Mr. Vance when he was arrested in the park on May 22, 1999, not based on seeing him in
the park on May 15, 1999. (R. 144:207.)

Bruce Benzon, who was shown the photo array

in September of 1999, testified that he was unable to pick anyone out of the photo line-up.
(R. 144:154.)
ii

Witness's Mental Capacity and State of Mind at Time of
Identification

When H.S. and M.S. saw the man expose himself to them, H.S. was ten years old.
(R. 144:73.) M.S. was seven. (R. 144:92.) At the time of trial, H.S. and M.S. were the
same ages. Aside from age, there is nothing to indicate that mental capacity or state of
mind played any role in the inability of M.S. and H.S. to identify Mr. Vance from the
photo line-up or in their ability to suddenly identify Mr. Vance at trial. Similarly, there is
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nothing to indicate that mental capacity or state of mind played a role in the inability of
Ms. Swenson, Ms. Segura, Mr. Segura and Mr. Benzon to identify Mr. Vance from the
photo line-up or in the ability of Ms. Swenson and Ms. Segura to identify Mr. Vance as
the man from the park on May 15, 1999, at the trial.
Mi

Witness's Exposure to Opinions, Descriptions, Identifications, or
Other Information from Other Sources

In the victim impact statement portion of Mr. Vance's presentence report, Corina
Swenson informed the presentence investigator as follows: "She said it was her
understanding the subject has done this before and feels he should not be allowed on the
streets. Ms. Swenson said she would like to insure this doesn't happen to anyone else."
(Confidential Exhibit 3.) At sentencing, defense counsel objected and expressed concerns
that the witnesses were aware of this information prior to trial and that may have
influenced their decision to identify Mr. Vance as the perpetrator of the offense. (R. 145:
3-4.) Defense counsel clarified with the court that she had been unaware of the victims'
knowledge of Mr. Vance's prior history until the presentence report was submitted for
sentencing and that as such, sentencing was the first opportunity Mr. Vance had to object
to the disclosure of that information. (R. 145: 4.)
There is no doubt that if Ms. Swenson and the other adults were informed by
police officers, the prosecutor, or any other arm of the state that Mr. Vance had a prior
lewdness conviction, any subsequent identification would have been tainted by such
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information. This is particularly true given that none of the witnesses were capable of
picking Mr. Vance out of a photo lineup within a few months of the incident. If the
witnesses were informed that the person arrested and charged with committing the
lewdness offense had a prior history of lewdness offenses, such information would have
been highly prejudicial and would have seriously impacted any identification made
thereafter. Attempts by defense counsel to discover when the witnesses were informed of
this information and by whom have been met with hostility. An investigator from LDA
has made numerous attempts to contact the witnesses to discover when they became
aware of Mr. Vance's prior conviction and who provided them with this information.
(See Report attached hereto as Addendum C.) The witnesses have hung up on the
investigator or otherwise refused to speak with him. At a minimum, Mr. Vance is entitled
to a hearing to determine when the witnesses became aware of this information and if the
information was obtained pretrial or during trial, Mr. Vance would be entitled to a new
trial.
Although Corina claimed at trial that she limited her discussions of the case with
her daughters (R. 144: 133-34), her daughters' descriptions of the perpetrator are
suspiciously similar to her description. In speaking with Officer Volpe on the date of the
incident, the perpetrator was described by Corina, H.S. and M.S. as Ma gray haired mid
40's [sic] male with green shirt and tan shorts. He had a moustache.1' (R. 41.)
At trial, H.S. described the man who exposed himself to her as having sunglasses,
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a moustache and curly hair. H.S. indicated the man was wearing short shorts and a green
shirt. (R. 144: 78.) M.S. was unable to offer any description whatsoever of the man at
trial. (R. 144: 98-99.) M.S., however, did admit that the prosecutor and her mom and dad
had talked to her about what she was going to say in the courtroom. (R. 144: 104-05.)
Corina's description of the man at trial was that he had on dark sunglasses, really short
shorts and curly dark hair with some gray. (R. 144: 113-14.) Corina indicated that she
does hair, so she is particularly aware of people's hair, and she noticed the waves in the
back of the man's hair. (R. 144: 139-40.) Denise Segura testified that the man she saw in
the gray car had dark graying hair, a moustache and sunglasses. (R. 144: 184.)
At the time of the first identification, there was no mention of sunglasses or wavy
hair. However, all of the witnesses suddenly remembered sunglasses and wavy hair when
they testified at trial, more eight months after the incident occurred. Clearly, there was
some discussion among the Swenson family internally and between the Seguras and the
Swensons regarding the identification of the man in the park.
Moreover, at trial, Harry Segura testified that he was able to identify Mr. Vance in
court based on Mr. Vance's presence in the park on May 22, 1999, a week following the
incident (R. 144: 207.) The defense did not dispute Mr. Vance's presence in the park and
his arrest on May 22, 1999. Denise Segura, Harry's wife, testified that she and Harry
came to form the belief that the person in the number two position of the photo lineup
was the perpetrator based on a process of elimination, which they engaged in together.
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(R. 144: 198.) Clearly the Seguras reached their identifications, both in the photo lineup
and in court, through a process of elimination and discussion between themselves. Again,
Mr. Segura's identification was admittedly based solely on his observation of Mr. Vance
in the park on May 22, 1999. There is no doubt that his identification of Mr. Vance from
May 22, influenced his wife's identification, which purportedly stemmed from seeing Mr.
Vance on May 15, 1999.
Accordingly, it appears the witnesses shared information regarding their
descriptions of the perpetrator and came to a convenient consensus, not to mention that
the witnesses were informed that Mr. Vance had a prior lewdness conviction. Certainly
this information would seriously undermine the reliability of any in-court identification.
iv

Prior Inconsistent Descriptions of the Actor

Because there was only one identification of the perpetrator given by the girls and
Ms. Swenson, the only prior inconsistency although substantial is the fact that none of the
witnesses could pick Mr. Vance out of the six person lineup showed to them a few
months after the incident.
v

Circumstances Under Which Defendant Presented to Witness for
Identification

Despite the inability of the witnesses to pick Mr. Vance's photo from the six
person photo lineup a few months after the incident, when Mr. Vance was the only man
from the photo lineup present in the courtroom and sitting at defense counsel table, the
36

witnesses were all able to identify Mr. Vance in-court. Of course, there was nobody else
for the witnesses to identify on the day of trial. Thus the Hobson's choice for the
witnesses that day was to pick Mr. Vance or to pick no one at all. As previously noted, if
the witnesses had been informed of Mr. Vance's prior conviction pretrial or during trial,
then of course the witnesses would have no problem saying that Mr. Vance was the
perpetrator of the May 15, 1999, offense, even if he was not.
E.

EVENT OBSERVED AND LIKELIHOOD OF REMEMBRANCE

Fifth, and finally, an analysis of the nature of the event being observed and the
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly is necessary
to the determination of the reliability of an identification. This analysis includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's.
Here, there is no doubt that this event was not an ordinary event in the minds of
H.S. and M.S. However, both H.S. and M.S. were quite young when the incident
occurred and they did not observe the man who exposed himself for any significant
period of time. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that seeing a man by the restroom
was an extraordinary event in Corina's life or anything that would cause her to more
accurately perceive, remember and relate her identification of that man as the perpetrator
of the offense. This is particularly so when Ms. Swenson's identification of the man by
the bathroom as the same man in the car was based solely on seeing the man in the car
37

from at least a forty-foot distance and observing sunglasses and a moustache. With
regard to Ms. Segura, seeing a man sitting in his parked car is not an extraordinary event
that would cause a person to more accurately perceive, remember and relate the
identification of the man in the car.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE'S MOTION
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND TO DISMISS WITH REGARD TO
THE CHARGES ALLEGING M.P. AS A VICTIM
The trial court committed error in failing to grant defendant's motion for directed

verdict and/or to dismiss as to Count III of the information when the alleged victim, M.P.,
did not testify at trial. Without the testimony of Miss Peay, the state presented
insufficient evidence to support a conviction on Count III.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court affords tremendous deference
to a jury verdict. A jury verdict will only be reversed when, "after viewing the evidence
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [the court]
find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight
and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v.
Lopez, 2001 UT App. 123, % 10 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2001); quoting State v. Silva.
2000 UT App 292,1f 13, 13 P.3d 604 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2000). Furthermore, to
support a claim for insufficient evidence on appeal, the defendant must marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and demonstrate how the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
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disputed findings. See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990).
The defendant was charged with three counts of lewdness involving a child, a class
A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (1953, as amended). To
convict Mr. Vance of each of these three counts, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Vance intentionally or knowingly, in the presence of a child
under 14 years of age, exposed his genitals or pubic area in a private place under
circumstances the actor should have known would likely cause affront or alarm.7 Mr.
Vance was charged with three counts because the alleged conduct occurred in the
presence of M.P., H.S., and M.S., all allegedly children under 14 years of age.
At trial, H.S. and M.S. both testified and were subject to cross-examination. (R.
144: 72-106.) However, M.S. Peay, the alleged victim involved in Count III of the
information was not present at the trial and did not testify. Furthermore, the State made

7

The elements discussed above are fact-specific. The exact wording from the
information charging Mr. Vance reads as follows for each of the three counts:
LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 7300 South 700 East,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about May 15, 1999, inviolation of Title 76,
Chapter 9, Section 702.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
STEPHEN K. VANCE, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly do any of
the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of age; performed an
act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; exposed his genitals, the female breast below the top
of the areola, the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area; in a public place; or in a private
place; under circumstances the actor should have known would likely cause affront or
alarm; or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child;
masturbated; engaged in trespassory voyeruism; caused a child under the age of 14 years
to expose his or her genitals, anus, or breast, if female, to the actor, with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; or performed any other act of
lewdness. (R. at 5-7).
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no attempt to have M.S. Peay designated as an unavailable witness.
The marshaled evidence regarding Count III is as follows. At trial, H.S. testified
regarding her view of the events of May 15, 1999. She explained that she was present at
her brother's baseball game on that day with her family, including her sister M.S., as well
as her friend M.P. (R. 144: 76.) H.S. was unable to tell the court the age of her friend
M.P. When asked M.P.'s age, H.S. answered, "I think seven." (R. 144: 76.) H.S. went
on to explain that her mother was watching the game from her chair by the bleachers
while the three girls played games in the family van. (R. 144:77-78.) While playing board
games, H.S. notice a "silver rusty car" pull up beside them with a white male inside the
vehicle. H.S. testified that she "looked over the seat" and saw the man's penis. (R. 144:
78.) She then told her sister and her friend what she had seen. When asked what
happened after she told her sister and her friend, she replied, "[a]nd then we were kinda
shocked, so we stayed in the car and after a little while, we went and told my mom." (R.
144: 80).
Next, H.S.'s sister M.S. testified regarding her recollection of May 15, 1999. She
reiterated that she had gone with her family and her friend M.P. to her brother's baseball
game on that date. (R. 144: 96.) M.S. testified that her friend M.P. was in the second
grade and was seven years old. (R. 144:97.) She went on to explain that the three girls
were playing board games in the family van. (R. 144:97.) While playing games in the
van, M.S. testified that a man in a car pulled up to them and "flashed" them. (R. 144: 9840

99.) The only additional mention of M.P. by M.S. was when she explained to the State
prosecutor that she, H.S. and M.P. had exited the van to go tell Mrs. Swenson what had
occurred. (R. 144:98-99.)
At the end of the State's case, defense counsel moved for directed verdict as to all
three counts of the information, but specifically asked the court to direct a verdict in favor
of the defendant as to the count involving M.P. due to her lack of testimony at trial. (R.
144:209.) The trial court denied defense counsel's motion by stating that, in the court's
opinion, "there's enough evidence here from which one could draw a reasonable
inference that the three girls saw what they saw and a reasonable inference that the one
girl who has not testified is under the age of 14 .. .ff (R. 144: 211.)
The trial court erred in its conclusion. Even granting all reasonable inferences to
the State, the evidence adduced from M.S. and H.S. fails in any way to establish that M.P.
actually saw the man in the car with an exposed penis. The entirety of the testimony was
that H.S. and M.S. saw the man expose himself while they were playing board games in
the family van with their friend M.P. No mention is ever made that M.P. ever looked out
the window and noticed the "silver rusty" car or ever saw a man in that car with an
exposed penis. Moreover, the prosecutor failed to elicit where M.P., M.S. and H.S. were
positioned inside the vehicle, i.e., facing north, south, east or west, and thus no evidence
that M.P. was ever in a position to see the man in the car.
Even granting that M.P. was in the van on May 15, 1999, if she did not see the
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man in the car with an exposed penis, a crucial element of the offense is missing, namely
that the act did not occur in the presence of a child under 14 years of age. Without
additional testimony by either M.P. herself or more detail from M.S. and H.S., the jury
had absolutely no reasonable basis to conclude that M.P. saw a man with an exposed
penis. Thus, the trial court erred by allowing Count III of the information go to the jury
where the evidence to support the verdict was so completely lacking as to make any
verdict rendered based on those facts plainly unreasonable and unjust.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Vance respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his convictions and remand this case for a new trial. At a minimum, Mr. Vance
requests that this Court vacate the conviction with respect to count III, involving M.P. and
order that the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the district court be
amended to reflect such changes.
SUBMITTED this 3*± day of May, 2001.

ItlAUM^J^
JON N.ROMERO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Addendum B

Set

Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History- Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.

b4

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Addendum C

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

To: Shannon Romero
From: Joey Finocchio
Date: March 26, 2001
Re: State vs. Stephen Vance

Shannon, concerning the intake that you sent to me on 3/8/01 asking me to interview
Karina Swenson and Denise Segura, mothers of the alleged victims of this case. I began with
Mrs. Swenson it took numerous calls but I finally was able to speak with her. Our conversation
began with me telling her who IAM and who I work for, I then asked if she would be willing to
speak to me concerning the matters you had asked in your intake, Mrs. Swenson seemed
agreeable until I began my questions at which point she stopped me and asked again who I was
and who I work for? I again explained to her who IAM and who I work for, at which point she
got some what upset and said she would not be willing to speak with me and stated she would be
contacting someone at the D.A.'s office concerning me calling. At that point she hung up the
phone.
Concerning interviewing Mrs. Segura, I have made numerous calls and also personally
went to Ms. Segura's home in Draper Utah and left a written not asking her to please contact me
concerning this matter but as of this date I have had no response from her...
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Addendum F

INSTRUCTION

NO.\]Ly/

PRESUMPTION (W INNO( 'KNCR:
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until he/she is proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by
the jun al plcastiir tail in a sittisianHtal essential pari of Ihe law intended, a*» iat as human agency is
capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in the minds of the jury unless
iiiinl uiiiil Ihe iiJiy is satisfied bryond a reasonable detiibi f (lie1 #\\\\\ of die defeinianl

\nd m case of

a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to an acquittal.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This burden never shifts to a defendant kn line law ncvei imposes upon a defendant in :i CTIIIIIIJ.II
case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\7

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And, in case of

a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainty.*•*Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt
-that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence .*Tt
which is merely

must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt

fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly

speculative possibility. -*—^Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it, and obviates all reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a

doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it
must arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this
case.
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